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APPELLANTS5 REPLY BRIEF

I.

ONCE AN APPLICANT MAKES A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NONIMPAIRMENT, THE BURDEN OF PROVING IMPAIRMENT SHIFTS TO
THE PROTESTANT.
The State Engineer initially argues that the burden never shifts from a change

applicant to a protestant to prove impairment, even after the change applicant makes a
prima facie showing of non-impairment. (Eng'r Br. at 22.) Thus, the State Engineer
asserts the trial court erred in shifting the burden of proof to Milburn after the Searles
made their prima facie case. (See id.)
The first problem with this argument is that it is not clear whether the trial court
shifted the burden of production or proof to Milburn, because its decision does not
expressly state as much. (Op. at 9-10,Tflj6-8.) In fact, none of the parties specifically
brought to the trial court's attention whether the burden that shifted to Milburn was one
of proof or production. (R. passim.) While this Court can affirm the trial court on
alternative grounds, even where such grounds are not raised below, it can only do so
when the alternate legal ground or theory is "apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles,
2002 UT 58, ^fl3 & n.3, 52 P.3d 1158. The unclear language in the trial court's decision
and the lack of a record on the issue deprives this Court of the opportunity to accept the
State Engineer's initial argument, and affirm on that basis alone. See id. at ^13 n.3.
The second problem with this argument is that it is an incorrect statement of the
law. The State Engineer bases his argument on general case law addressing motions to
1

dismiss, burdens of proof in general civil and criminal cases, and a claim that Crafts v.
Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983) merely refers to "shifting [the] burden of production
of evidence, not the ultimate burden of proof." (Eng'r Br. at 19.)
In Crafts, this Court said just the opposite of what the State Engineer seeks to have
this Court imply. There the court stated that once an applicant makes a prima facie
showing that there is reason to believe his change can be lawfully approved the burden of
"proving" impairment shifts to the protestant. Crafts, 667 P.2d at 1081 (emphasis
added). Of course, this has always been the standard. See Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367,
378, 77 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1938) (showing of general negative of non-impairment by
applicant is sufficient "to put the protestant on proof 'that he would be injured" (emphasis
added)); Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 174-75, 48 P.2d 484, 488-89 (1935)
(rejecting argument that burden of proving non-impairment remains, at all times, with the
applicant).
In sum, after ruling that the Searles met their burden of showing non-impairment,
the trial court correctly shifted the burden of proving impairment to Milburn. It is
whether Milburn's factual showing was sufficient to sustain a finding of impairment that
is the central issue on appeal.

2

IT

VPPELLEES' P R O P O S E D S T A N D A R D O F P R O O F C O N F L K I S \V 1111
E S T A B L I S H E D P R E C E D E N T A N D IS A T O D D S W I T H T H E
PRELIMINARY NATURE OF CHANGE USE APPLICATIONS.
A.

A Preponderance Of The Evidence Standard For Showing
Impairment, By Definition, Leaves Doubt A b o u t Whether Impairment
Might Actually Result If A Change Is A p p r o v e d .

Milburn and the State Engineer focus their attention on the preponderance of the
evidence standard. They assert that under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the
trial court's finding of a likely hydrologic connection is sufficient to show impairment as
a matter of law because the preponderance of the evidence standard onK requires a
showing of "more likely than not." (Mil. Br. at 14-18 (citing Harken Southwest Corp. v.
State ex. Rel. D e p ' t of Natural Resources, 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996) (defining
preponderance of the evidence as "more likely than not."); E n g ' r Br. at 23.)
However, this standard simply cannot be squared with long-standing precedent
which requires more than a factual showing that approval of an application might,
possibly, could, or has the potential to impair vested rights. See American Fork Irrigation
Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 95, 239 P.2d 188, 191 (1951). See also Brief of Appellants at
22-24, 33-35 discussing cases in Utah and other western states which establish this
principle.
Regardless of the spin Milburn and the State Engineer place on the term, a finding
of a likely connection is no better than a showing of a possible or potential connection.
The State Engineer indicated as much in his memorandum decision, stating "[g]iven the
likely possibility

of fractures in the geologic strata, the area proposed for diversion could
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serve as a contributing source for the protestanf s water supply." (Mem. Dec. March 8,
2002) (Emphasis added.)1 Indeed, in this context, "likely" is simply a euphemism for
"possibly" or "could." This is not enough under our case law.
Moreover, as set forth in our opening brief (at 23, 31), this Court has held that in a
doubtful case, where the conclusion is not clear, the policy of this state is to approve the
application. See Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball 76 Utah 243, 248, 289 P. 116,
118 (1930). Milbum asserts this is not a doubtful case, but advances a standard that by
definition leaves some level of doubt and uncertainty. Thus, if this case turns on the
evidentiary standard, as Milburn argues, the standard cannot be preponderance of the
evidence.
The standard that removes the doubt and uncertainty is the standard we advanced
below, a standard that requires the protestant to show clearly and definitively—clearly
and convincingly—that its rights will be impaired. Proof is not clear and convincing "if
the court entertains reasonable doubt." Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.
Ca, 118 Utah 41, 44, 233 P.2d 699, 700 (1951). This is what we argued below. (R. 175
Tr. 256, 257:1-2.) To be clear and convincing, a matter
must at least have reached a point where there remains no serious or
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. A mind which
was of the opinion that it was convinced and yet which entertained not a
slight, but a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its conclusion would
seem to be in a state of confusion.
Kirchgestner, 118 Utah at 44, 233 P.2d at 700 (citation omitted). Moreover, clear and
convincing proof "has the element of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and
1

Attached at Addendum C to our opening brief.
4

convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise probable to the mind." Id. (citation
omitted).
This is the standard that removes the doubt from these cases and furthers the
policy of ensuring that water is put to beneficial use, that an applicant will be allowed a
period of experimentation to show, once and for all, that the change will not impair
vested rights, and will ensure that the State Engineer (and trial court on de novo review)
is not adjudicating water rights. The trial court's finding that there is a likely connection
between Milbum's source of water and the Searles' proposed source of supply because,
as stated by the trial court, "the water has got to come from somewhere," (R. 175 Tr.
266:21) does not meet the legal standard for showing impairment.
Thus, while this Court can defer to the trial court's finding of a "likely" hydrologic
connection,2 it should reverse the ultimate conclusion that such a finding constitutes
impairment as a matter of law. See Low v. City of Monticello, 2004 UT 90, ^[11, 103
P.3d 130 (appellate court defers to trial court's factual findings but grants no deference to
its conclusions that such findings constitute the legal issue in question).

2

Both Milburn (Mil. Br. at 21) and the State Engineer (Eng'r Br. at 4) somewhat
indirectly refer to the marshaling requirement. However, we do not lodge a challenge to
the trial court's factual finding that there is a likely hydrologic connection, i.e., we do not
assert this finding is clearly erroneous. Rather, we assert that the finding, as a matter of
law, does not constitute impairment. Thus, this Court cannot affirm for the sole reason
that we seek a legal determination on the effect of an unchallenged finding. See Saunders
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, (Utah 1991) (once appellate court affirms factual findings, it
must then proceed to "review the trial court's conclusions of law and its application of
the law to the facts as found.").

5

B.

This Court Did Not Establish A Preponderance Of The Evidence
Standard In Crafts.

Milburn grounds its argument for a preponderance standard by quoting dicta from
Crafts, wherein a majority of the court referred to a protestant's burden as showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that a change cannot lawfully be approved. Slee Crafts,
667 P.2d at 1081 (Durham, J., joined by Howe & Stewart, JJ.). However, in Crafts, the
"sole issue" before the court was whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact
precluding summary judgment. Id, at 1069. The majority's language concerning a
preponderance of the evidence standard was therefore dicta and "of no particular concern
as precedent." Knight v. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 2d 394, 396, 315 P.2d 273, 274 (1957)
(questions not directly presented for review are dicta and do not create binding
precedent); see also DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah 1995) Oudicial statements
made in the course of discussion of an issue not directly confronting the court do not
constitute the holding of the court).
Indeed, it would be illogical to believe that the majority would, at the outset of its
opinion reiterate the standard it had been articulating since at least 1954, see Crafts, 667
P.2d at 1070, then at the conclusion of its opinion intentionally abandon this standard,
particularly where the issue was not placed squarely before the court complete with
briefing on the competing arguments and interests—as in the instant case. If Milburn is
correct, then so was Justice Oaks in asserting that the majority was unwittingly reversing
long-standing precedent. See id. at 1082-83 (Oaks, J., dissenting).
The State Engineer concedes this point in his brief. (Eng'r Br. at 19.)

6

However, we need not go that far. If the majority in Crafts intended to overrule
long-standing precedent it could have easily said so in that case. It did not. To the
contrary, it noted that it was not overruling precedent but merely holding that a genuine
issue of fact existed for trial, thus precluding summary judgment. See id. at 1071 n.2.
Therefore, until such time as this Court determines to overrule itself and accept a burden
that requires such a low standard of proof that a protestant can simply stumble over it,
under the principle of stare decisis it must follow its prior rulings. See State v.
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995).
In sum, this Court has never held that the burden in change application cases is a
preponderance of the evidence.

III.

THE DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT FOR SHOWING
IMPAIRMENT IS NECESSARY AND WORKABLE.
Milburn asserts that requiring direct evidence is unworkable in these cases. (Mil.

Br. at 22-26.) However, because such evidence was not present does not mean it is
impossible to come by. Indeed, the state's own experts testified that while this evidence
may be difficult to come by, actual testing is the only way to be sure of a hydrologic
connection. (R. 175 Tr. 177-79; 224:6-9.)
This is not unheard of. It is the type of evidence that was required in Washington
County Water Conservancy District v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125. It is the type
of evidence the Idaho Supreme Court required in In re Boyer when it refused to find
impairment. See 248 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Idaho 1952) (finding no impairment because
there was no "determination of a definitive amount of water" that would be lost from

7

approval of a change). And it does not mean that testing is always necessary. For
example, in Heine v. Reynolds, 367 P.2d 708 (N.M. 1962), impairment was shown
because there was positive testimony that when water was pumped from a water source it
increased the salt content of water in the source, which impaired prior vested rights. See
id at 711.
Milburn relies on Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 5 P.3d
1206, and argues that the Utah Supreme Court does not require such evidence in water
rights cases. However, Silver Fork is inapposite. It was a quiet title action. See id. at
^18. Thus, the court was not faced with the same principles and limitations that are
present in change application cases. In particular here, that the State Engineer, and by
extension the trial court on de novo review, does not have the authority to adjudicate
water rights. See Green River Canal Co v. Thavn, 2003 UT 50, Tf30, 84 P.3d 1134.
However, accepting Milburn5 s arguments this Court will have done just that.
Milburn also asserts that we have advocated, essentially, a double standard insofar
as Robinson may have relied on circumstantial evidence in rendering his opinion but we
are advocating for direct evidence from Milburn. (Mil. Br. at 24.) Milburn is correct in
this regard and the reason is obvious. Analyzing the respective burdens of applicant and
protestant by using the Pena pasture metaphor, see State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38
(Utah 1994), when the Searles were attempting to show that their application could be
approved without impairing Milburn5 s rights, the pasture was large and the trial court, as
fact finder, was given considerable room to roam—discretion—in making its
determination. See , e.g.. United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 11, 238 P.2d 1132,

8

1137 (1951); American Fork Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 95, 239 P.2d 188, 191
(1951); Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n, 2 Utah 2d 141, 143-44,
270 P.2d 453, 455 (1954); see also Aplt Br. at 21-24, 27-32.
However, when the burden shifts to the protestant, the pasture of discretion shrinks
considerably. As we argued below, the only evidence that is legally sufficient to meet the
burden established by this smaller pasture is evidence that shows, clearly and definitively,
that the water at point A comes out at point B. It is undisputed this evidence was not
presented in this case. (Op. at 8, ^32 (finding "there is no direct evidence" of a
hydrologic connection).) With such evidence the trial court could have definitively
concluded that Milburn would be impaired if the Searles' Change Application was
approved.
Milburn, while not referring specifically to the standard of review and discretion
afforded the trial court, suggests that such discretion must always be broad because we
are dealing with scientific issues in which expert testimony must be weighed and
considered. In Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline
Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, 98 P.3d 1, this Court recognized that "the importance of
insuring that the waters of our state are put to beneficial use" mandates the narrowing of
the discretion afforded trial courts. Id. at ^49-50. Butler, Crockett & Walsh was before
the court in the context of reviewing a trial court's ruling on beneficial use. See id. at
1[50.
Ultimately the court determined the amount of discretion afforded trial courts
should be significant, though not broad. See id. This was due, in part, to the fact "that
9

the concept of beneficial use is "not static." Id. at ^[46. What may constitute beneficial
use in one case may not constitute beneficial use in the next. See id. Not so with
impairment. Either an applicant is seeking to draw water from a protestant's source or he
is not. It is the protestant's burden to show the former. Milbum failed to do so in this
case.
In sum, the direct evidence standard for showing impairment is a necessary and
workable burden to place on protestants after an applicant has made his prima facie case.

IV.

NEITHER MILBURN NOR THE STATE ENGINEER HAVE PROPERLY
CHALLENGED THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE SEARLES
MET THEIR PRIMA FACIE BURDEN.
Milbum and the State Engineer argue that a likely hydrologic connection is the

greatest possible showing that could have been required of them, because everything else
is, essentially, junk science. In this regard, they liberally pepper their briefs with excerpts
of Robinson's testimony, quotes from his publications, and comments from the trial court
that, read in isolation, suggest that the theory advanced by Forbush and Williamson was
on firmer scientific footing than Robinson's.
However, if that was the case, the trial court was free to reject Robinson's view
and determine that the Searles did not meet their burden of showing non-impairment.
However, the trial court did not do so. Rather, it accepted Robinson's testimony and
theory with respect to non-impairment by expressly finding "there is reason to believe the
groundwater intercepted by and providing the source for the Jacobson Well is a source of
water completely separate from and has no hydrologic connection with the source of

10

supply for Milburn." (Op. at 7, f31.) On appeal, neither Milburn nor the State Engineer
challenges this determination as clearly erroneous.
While it is not necessary for an appellee to file a cross-appeal in arguing to affirm
on the grounds that the trial court committed an error in another aspect of the case which
leads to the same result, our appellate courts have never held that this relieves an appellee
from its obligation to show that error as it would any other issue on appeal. See Nova
Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, f7, 983 P.2d 575; State v. South, 924 P.2d
354, 356-57 (Utah 1996).
Thus, this Court must summarily reject Milburn and the State Engineer's efforts to
weave uncertainty into Robinson's testimony, and by extension the Searles' prima facie
case, to gain advantage on appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in our opening brief, the trial court's
judgment must be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this p

day of March 2005.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

BiyarnJ. Pattison
Attorneys for Appellants
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